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LEVEL OF SKILL AND LONG-FELT NEED: NOTES ON A
FORGOTTEN FUTURE
by
Joseph Scott Miller
The Supreme Court's KSR decision transforms the way we think about pat-
ent law's ordinary artisan. The ordinary artisan, the Supreme Court states,
"is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton." This transfor-
mation, which sweeps aside a contrary precept that had informed the Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence for a generation, raises a key ques-
tion: How do we fill out the rest of our conception, in a given case, of the or-
dinary artisan's level of skill at the time the invention was made? Reaching
back to a large vein of case law typified by Judge Learned Hand's decisions
about nonobviousness, as well as an all-but-forgotten nonobviousness bill
that died in committee in 1948, the author shows that the modern "level of
skill" inquiry can comfortably rely on evidence of long-felt, unmet need in the
art and the failure of others to meet that need.
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[A]nd the best test of what persons of routine ingenuity can do is what they
have done.
Judge Learned Hand'
Assoc. Prof., Lewis & Clark Law School. 2008 ©Joseph Scott Miller. Upon pub-
lication of this work in the Lewis & Clark Law Review, I license my copyright in this
work to all under the Creative Commons license known as Attribution 3.0 Unported.
You can see a summary of this license at http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/3.0/. Attribution should be to me as the author and to Lewis & Clark Law
Review as the first publisher. Upon my death, my copyright in this work is dedicated to
the public domain. Comments are welcome at getmejoemiller@gmail.com.
Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 117 F.2d 361, 364 (2d Cir.),
rev'd, 314 U.S. 84 (1941). See alsoW. States Mach. Co. v. S.S. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d
345, 347 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) ("As we have often repeated, in judging what
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I. INTRODUCTION
"A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton. 2 The Supreme Court, with this statement, swept aside a
contrary precept that had guided the patent law doctrine of nonobvious-
ness for a generation at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit"). At the Federal Circuit, the person having ordinary
skill in the art-or "PHOSITA," the objective construct from whose per-
spective one must judge the question of nonobviousness -was "an un-
creative plodder, incapable of making inventions of his own. 4 In KSR, its
first decision about the nonobviousness doctrine in thirty-one years,5 the
Supreme Court transformed our understanding of the PHOSITA's gen-
erative capacity and skill: "Common sense teaches," for example, "that
familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and
in many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. 6 As a consequence,
when analyzing the question whether an invention would have been ob-
vious to the PHOSITA at the time the invention was made, "a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordi-
nary skill in the art would employ."7 As I have discussed elsewhere, I think
the change from recent nonobviousness doctrine is fundamental.
requires uncommon ingenuity, the best standard is what common ingenuity has
failed for long to contrive under the same incentive.").
2 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective
of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 891 (2004). See alsoJoseph P. Meara, Just Who
is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH.
L. REV. 267, 276 (2002) ("Phosita is not the inventor, but rather an uncreative person
that thinks along conventional lines, never seeking to innovate.").
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976). Sakraida was one of two decisions
about nonobviousness decided in the October 1975 Term; the other was Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
' KSI, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. Others have noted the magnitude of the change from
Federal Circuit doctrine. See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner, Making Sense of KSR
and Other Recent Patent Cases, 106 FIRsT IMPRESSIONs 39, 41 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll06/patentall.pdf ("Unlike
the pre-KSR automaton, the post-KSR worker in the art has 'ordinary creativity.' As a
result, inventions that were nonobvious the day before KSR suddenly became obvious
to this modern man of ordinary skill in the art.").
7 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
' See Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEx. INTELL. PROP. LJ. 237
(2007). 1 say "recent" because KSR's recognition of the PHOSITA's creativity makes
explicit what had long been implicit in the Supreme Court's deep skepticism about
the likely patentability of inventions that merely reconfigure prior art elements in an
admittedly new way. The Court expressed its skepticism most clearly in Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) ("Courts
should scrutinize combination patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty
and improbability of finding invention [i.e., nonobviousness] in an assembly of old
elements."). If the PHOSITA is creative, and thus can remix prior art elements to
[Vol. 12:2
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Whether the change it ushers is fundamental or modest, however,
KSR's rationale encourages us to explore more deeply how we can best
determine the ordinary artisan's level of skill at the time the invention
was made. The "level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art" is, after all,
one of the "basic factual inquiries" that the nonobviousness requirement
set forth in section 103(a) mandates.9 KSR tells us that the PHOSITA is
creative, rather than an automaton. How do we fill out the rest of the
PHOSITA's skill profile in a given case? The inquiry is a challenge, be-
cause it pertains to both a hypothetical construct (rather than a concrete
question about an actual person) and a technological domain that is
likely unfamiliar to a generalist federal judge.'l To date, "this critical fac-
tual inquiry has received comparatively little attention from the Federal
Circuit."" Indeed, the now-common approach, typified by a cursory rds-
um6-type statement,' looks a bit pallid in KSR's brighter light.
solve a problem, many solutions that are new will also be obvious: "The combination
of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results." KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. And KSR expressly
reaffirms Great Atlantic. Id. (quoting Great Atl., and stating that "[n]either the enact-
ment of § 103 nor the analysis in Graham disturbed this Court's earlier instructions
concerning the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of
elements found in the prior art."). I am not the first to note that the Court's skepti-
cism about the likely patentability of combination claims grows out of the Court's
sense of the PHOSITA's basic skills. See Mary Helen Sears, Combination Patents and 35
U.S.C. § 103, 1977 DET. C.L. REv. 83, 94 ("Manifestly, the Supreme Court has long
been convinced.., that merely combining old elements to arrive at a necessarily ex-
pected, additive result is always within the ordinary level of skill in any art and hence,
obvious Under section 103 and nonmeritorious of an exclusive patent grant."); id. at
99 ("the level of ordinary skill at any given time affords the basis for associating old
elements in any manner which merely takes advantage of their known capabilities.").
' Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). KSR expressly reaffirms the
Court's commitment to the Graham framework, including the importance of a find-
ing about the PHOSITA's level of skill at the time the invention was made. See KSR,
127 S. Ct. at 1734 (quoting Graham and stating that "the [Graham] factors continue to
define the inquiry that controls.").
'0 The Patent Office's expertise, though substantial, see In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310,
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003), delays rather than eliminates the problem of ignorance about
a given technology. Appeals from Patent Office rejections are taken to the federal
courts, either directly to the Federal Circuit or to the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia with an appeal thereafter. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §
145 (2000) And, like all-Article III federal judges, Federal Circuit judges come from a
wide range of backgrounds. See S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent
Law's Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw U. L. REv. 1735, 1740 &
n.28 (2007).
Meara, supra note 4, at 268.
2 See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("The district court first found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a
bachelor's degree in pharmaceutical science or analytical chemistry, and some ex-
perience in drugs and drug preparation."; "Neither party disputes the district court's
characterization of the ordinarily skilled artisan."); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The district court
found, and the parties do not dispute, that a person of ordinary skill in the art of
2008]
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Happily, there is a rich vein of Supreme Court and regional circuit
case law from which to recover a more vivid, fact-laden method for estab-
lishing the PHOSITA's level of skill in a given technology at a given time.
Judge Learned Hand's nonobviousness jurisprudence exemplifies this
method; he frequently established the ordinary artisan's level of skill by
carefully sifting evidence of long-felt, unmet need in the art (or the lack
14thereof). My goal here is to mine this jurisprudential vein, to help us
weigh whether we should return evidence of long-felt, unmet need in an
art to pride of place in determining the level of skill in that art. At least
one commentator recently suggested this use of long-felt need evidence,
5
and KSR renews our need to recapture available wisdom from the
nonobviousness jurisprudence of the regional circuit courts of appeals.
6
cigarette design in 1985 would have had a bachelor's degree in either engineering,
chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, and would have had at least five years
experience in the field of cigarette design."). See also Meara, supra note 4, at 280-81
(noting the typical focus on a short statement of educational attainment and work
experience).
" Most of Judge Hand's long judicial career-he served as a district court judge
from 1909 to 1924, and as an appeals court judge from 1924 to 1961, GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE xv-xvi, 133, 275-76 (1994)-
predated Congress's 1952 codification of the nonobviousness requirement in 35
U.S.C. § 103 (now, § 103(a)). Before section 103's enactment, it was common to refer
to the nonobviousness requirement as the invention requirement. See JANICE M.
MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAw 169 (2d ed. 2006). It is thus anachronis-
tic, but only slightly so, to call Judge Hand's pre-1952 decisions a "nonobviousness
jurisprudence." I do so for the reader's ease.
"4 See Clarence G. Galston, Invention and the "Obvious," 13 F.R.D. 463, 466 (1952)
('Judge Learned Hand ... finds invention when there is a long felt need in the art
and a failure to meet the need until the inventor came along with the successful
process or product."); Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Eco-
nomic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 863 (1988) ("Perhaps no judge
was more convinced that failure of others is a reliable consideration than Learned
Hand.... Although references to commercial success appear in some of Hand's
opinions, he reserved his most sweeping support for evidence of long-felt need and
failure of others.") (footnote omitted).
15 See Meara, supra note 4, at 295-96 ("Long-felt need and failure of others to
make the invention should not be utilized as 'secondary' considerations, but rather as
objective evidence of actual skill in the art .... When a problem is old in the art and
has been the subject of more than de minimus research, it suggests that no one of any
skill level was able to solve it. When combined with actual evidence that others failed
to solve the problem, one can infer that the solution has eluded those of ordinary
skill.") (footnote omitted). Prof. Chisum also notes long-felt need's value as evidence
of the level of skill. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.03 [4] [a], at 5-
209 (Supp. 2005) ("Yet, if an express finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art
is really critical in every case, then surely these factors [of "long-felt but unsolved
needs and failure of others in the art"] would be considered as direct and primary
evidence as to the level of skill in the pertinent art.").
"o See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) ("Throughout
this Cotrt's engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an
expansive and flexible approach. . . . To this end, Graham set forth a broad inquiry
and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations that
would prove instructive.").
[Vol. 12:2
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I proceed in three steps. First, I quickly inventory the pertinent Su-
preme Court and regional circuit court decisions about nonobviousness
that predate the 1952 Patent Act, in which Congress first codified the
nonobviousness requirement. Evidence of a long-felt, unmet need for the
inventor's new solution often played a vital role in assessing whether an
invention would have been obvious. Next, by examining how Congress
came to codify the nonobviousness requirement, I show that section
103's analytical method comfortably accommodates proof of long-felt
need and the failure of others as key circumstantial evidence of the level
of skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Those who champi-
oned section 103 acknowledged that the statute gives only the barest
framework, and using long-felt need (or the lack of it) to show the level
of skill comports with the framework. Finally, using section 103 cases
from the regional circuits, decided both before and after the Supreme
Court's assay of section 103 in Graham, I provide a glimpse of an alterna-
tive future we briefly had-and could have again.
II. ASSESSING PATENTABILITY WITH LONG-FELT NEED EVIDENCE
The modern nonobviousness requirement entered U.S. law with the
Supreme Court's 1851 decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.7 In Hotchkiss,
the Court struck down a patent claim to a clay doorknob on the ground
that the new doorknob configuration was too small an improvement to
• 18
merit protection. The new configuration included a clay knob around a
dovetail-based metal rod; the prior art included clay knobs with straight
rods and metal or wood knobs with dovetail rods.' 9 The Court assumed,
for purposes of argument, "that, by connecting the clay or porcelain
knob with the metallic shank in this well-known [dovetail] mode, an arti-
cle is produced better and cheaper than in the case of the metallic or
wood knob.""' Nevertheless, it held the new configuration to be unpat-
entable. According to the Court, an invention is not patentable unless its
achievement is marked by "more ingenuity and skill ... than were pos-
sessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."' The
Court thus contrasted "the work of the skillful mechanic" with "that of
the inventor,"2 2 whose creative response to the problem at hand reaches
past those that the ordinary mechanic, any ordinary mechanic, would of-
fer in that same situation. Section 103 continues this "functional ap-
proach," mandating the same "comparison between the subject matter of
" 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). See Mueller, supra note 13, at 170.
18 Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 266-67. For an engaging discussion of the Hotchkiss case
and its role in the history of the nonobviousness standard, see Edward C. Walter-
scheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness Standard: Early Judicial Activism in the Patent Law,
13J. INTELL. PROP. L. 103 (2005).
'9 Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 265.
20 Id at 266.
21 Id. at 267.
2 Id.
5832008]
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the patent, or patent application, and the background skill of the call-
ing.,
23
The nonobviousness inquiry poses, in effect, a causation question:
"What caused the inventor's success in making the invention? Her ex-
traordinary insight and skill beyond that of the ordinary inventor, or her
encounter with a problem situation that prompted an ordinary artisan's
conventional response?" Cognitive social psychologists have, since at least
the 1960s, studied how we make causal attributions of this type.24 Fritz
Heider, attribution theory's intellectual godfather, 5 described the impact
of evidence about exceptional success or failure:
If a person successfully completes an action, we say, 'He can do it'
but the implications are very different if we conclude 'He can do it
because it is so easy' or 'He can do it because he has such great abil-
ity.' ... If we know that only one person succeeded or only one per-
son failed out of a large number in a certain endeavor, then we
shall ascribe success or failure to this person-to his great ability or
to his lack of ability. On the other hand, if we know that practically
everyone who tries succeeds, we shall attribute the success to the
task. The task is then described as being easy. If hardly anyone suc-
ceeds it is felt to be difficult.
2 6
Heider's description bears a striking resemblance to the inference we
draw from long-felt, unmet need in an art, and the failure of others to
meet that need:
A defect in a product or process spurs the businessman to deploy
resources for discovering a solution.... Existence of the defect cre-
ates a demand for its correction, and it is reasonable to infer that
the defect would not persist were the solution 'obvious.' This is the
rationale of longfelt demand and its justification as a test of nonob-
viousness.27
21 Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966); see also id. at 17 (Section 103
"was intended merely as a codification ofjudicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss
condition"); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007) ("the princi-
ples laid down in Graham reaffirmed the 'functional approach' of Hotchkiss.").
24 See generally ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (Edward E.
Jones et al. eds., 1971); Harold H. Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social Psychology, 1967
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 192; Harold H. Kelley, The Processes of Causal At-
tribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973). For a general review of attribution theory,
see SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 174-88 (1993).
25 See Kelley, The Processes of Causal Attribution, supra note 24, at 107 (Heider's
work "has played a central role in the or[i]gination and definition of attribution the-
ory and continues to be the major source of ideas.").
26 FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 89 (1958).
2'7 Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness" A Nontechnical Approach
to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1169, 1172 (1964). In Graham, the Supreme Court
cited this student note in support of the proposition that "[s]uch secondary consid-
erations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the sub-
[Vol. 12:2
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This reasoning taps our basic framework for assessing causation gener-
ally, and thus remains quite powerful.
The reasoning also has a strong pedigree in Supreme Court and re-
gional circuit patent cases. The Supreme Court first relied on this
method of assessing patentability in 1875, upholding patent claims to
vulcanized rubber dentures against a Hotchkiss-style attack in Smith v.
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.2 ' The Court's careful reasoning about the
state of the art at the time it was made merits extended quotation:
We cannot resist the conviction that devising and forming such a
manufacture by such a process and of such materials was invention.
More was needed for it than simply mechanical judgment and good
taste. Were it not so, hard rubber would doubtless have been used
in the construction of artificial sets of teeth, gums, and plates long
before Cummings applied for his patent. To find a material, with a
mode of using it, capable of being combined with the teeth in such
a manner as to be free from the admitted faults of all other known
combinations, had been an object long and earnestly sought. It had
been a subject for frequent discussion among dentists and in scien-
tific journals. The properties of vulcanite were well known; but how
to make use of them for artificial sets of teeth remained undiscov-
ered, and apparently undiscoverable, until Cummings revealed the
mode. But when revealed its value was soon recognized, and no one
seems to have doubted that the resulting manufacture was a new
and most valuable invention.
The evidence points quite directly to the conclusion that Cummings ac-
complished something out of the ordinary; ordinary artisans, with just as
much incentive and access to the building blocks of the invention as
Cummings had, failed to do what he did.0 In subsequent cases, the Court
continued to verify that an invention would not have been obvious by re-
lying on evidence that it satisfied a long-felt, unmet need.3' The Court
ject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these
inquiries may have relevancy." Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
2 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
2 Id. at 494-95.
30 Judge Conner, who was a patent litigator before becoming a federal district
court judge, noted that "although all such types of evidence [about the history of the
art] are frequently referred to collectively and indiscriminately as 'circumstantial,'
evidence of unsuccessful efforts may closely approach the status of direct evidence."
William C. Conner, Some Highly Personal Reflections on Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 77, 78
(1977). Indeed, he described his own litigation experience this way: "So in every case
I tried, I looked desperately for evidence of trial and failure; if I found it, which I usu-
ally did, I hammered away at that one theme, almost to the disregard of everything
else. And it succeeded to an amazing degree." William C. Conner, Winning Patent In-fringement Suits-The Art of Swimming Against the Tide, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE
ULTIMATE CONDITION Or PATENTABILITY 4:401, at 402 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1978).
" See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944);
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 381 (1909); Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S.
597, 608 (1895); Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 143 U.S. 587, 594 (1892); Washburn &
2008]
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also relied on the absence of evidence of long-felt need to support the in-
ference that an invention would have been obvious to the PHOSITA.
32
Throughout the era that preceded the enactment of section 103, the
regional courts of appeals routinely analyzed nonobviousness by focusing
on evidence of long-felt, unmet need and the failures of others (or the
lack thereof). Apart from Second Circuit cases, which require special
note, there are at least 17 such regional court of appeals cases that pre-
date section 1 0 3 ," as well as five pre-section-103 cases that review rejected
applications on appeal from the Patent Office.34 The Second Circuit, by
itself, issued at least 23 long-felt need decisions before the enactment of
section 103; Judge Learned Hand authored 16 of these, 5 and other
judges authored seven.36
Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat 'em All Barbed Wire Co., 143 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1892); Loom
Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 591 (1881).
32 See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 486-87
(1944); Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 488
(1935); Paramount Publix Corp. v. Am. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 488 (1935).
" Watson v. Heil, 192 F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir. 1951); Lincoln Stores, Inc. v.
Nashua Mfg. Co., 157 F.2d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 1946); Trabon Eng'g Corp. v. Dirkes,
136 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943); Steiner Sales Co. v. Schwartz Sales Co., 98 F.2d 999,
1003 (10th Cir. 1938); Peerless Equip. Co. v. W.H. Miner, Inc., 93 F.2d 98, 104 (7th
Cir. 1937); Remington Rand Bus. Serv. v. Acme Card Sys. Co., 71 F.2d 628, 632 (4th
Cir. 1934); Mantle Lamp Co. v. George H. Bowman Co., 53 F.2d 441, 444 (6th Cir.
1931); Hughes Tool Co. v. Int'l Supply Co., 47 F.2d 490, 492 (10th Cir. 1931); Frick
Co. v. Lindsay, 27 F.2d 59, 61 (4th Cir. 1928); U.S. Indus. Chem. Co. v. Theroz Co.,
25 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1928); Trane Co. v. Nash Eng'g Co., 25 F.2d 267, 269
(1st Cir. 1928); Yablick v. Protecto Safety Appliance Corp., 21 F.2d 885, 886-87 (3d
Cir. 1927); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Columbus Elec. & Power Co., 19 F.2d 860, 863
(5th Cir. 1927); Elliott & Co. v. Youngstown Car Mfg. Co., 181 F. 345, 349 (3d Cir.
1910); Am. Caramel Co. v. Thomas Mills & Bro., 149 F. 743, 746 (3d Cir. 1906);
Farmers' Mfg. Co. v. Spruks Mfg. Co., 127 F. 691, 694 (4th Cir. 1904); Davis v. Park-
man, 71 F. 961, 964 (1st Cir. 1895).
4 Levin v. Coe, 132 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Thornton v. Coe, 102 F.2d
247, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp. v. Coe, 102 F.2d 236, 241
(D.C. Cir. 1938); Wach v. Coe, 77 F.2d 113, 114-16 (D.C. Cir. 1935); In re Fawick, 56
F.2d 873, 874 (C.C.P.A. 1932).
15 Landis Mach. Co. v. Parker-Kalon Corp., 190 F.2d 543, 546 (2d Cir. 1951);
Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1947); Safety Car
Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946); Con-
denser Corp. v. Micamold Radio Corp., 145 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1944); Automatic
Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 117 F.2d 361, 363-64 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 84
(1941); U.S. Hat Mach. Corp. v. Boesch Mfg. Co., 108 F.2d 417, 419 (2d Cir. 1939);
Nagy v. L. Mundet & Son, Inc., 101 F.2d 82, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1939); Textile Mach.
Works v. Louis Hirsch Textile Machs., 87 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1937); Hazeltine
Corp. v. Abrams, 79 F.2d 329, 332 (2d Cir. 1935); Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp.,
77 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1935); Ruben Condenser Co. v. Aerovox Corp., 77 F.2d 266,
268 (2d Cir. 1935); Hookless Fastener Co. v. G.E. Prentice Mfg. Co., 68 F.2d 940, 941
(2d Cir. 1934); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co., 67 F.2d 392, 397 (2d
Cir. 1933); H.C. White Co. v. Morton E. Converse & Son Co., 20 F.2d 311, 313 (2d
Cir. 1927); Kirsch Mfg. Co., v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793, 794 (2d Cir. 1925);
Auto Pneumatic Action Co. v. Kindler & Collins, 247 F. 323, 327-28 (2d Cir. 1917). 1
have not made any systematic search among Judge Hand's opinions for the U.S. Dis-
[Vol. 12:2
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Judge Hand was by no means a blind adherent to the focus on long-
felt, unmet need evidence. He recognized, for example, that a focus on
long-felt need "is a dan gerous test to apply, and will lead one astray
unless jealously watched." Long-felt need might be explained, in a given
case, by something other than the successful inventor's acumen:
If the machine or composition appears shortly after some obstacle
to its creation, technical or economic, has been removed, we should
scrutinize its success jealously; if at about the same time others be-
gin the same experiments in the same or nearby fields, or if these
come to fruition soon after the patentee's, the same is true. Such a
race does not indicate invention.
8
All the same, Hand appreciated-and explained-the comparative ad-
vantage, for a generalist judge, of relying on evidence of long-felt need
where the evidence was available. Perhaps best known is his account in
the Safety Car Heatingcase:
Courts, made up of laymen as they must be, are likely either to un-
derrate, or to overrate, the difficulties in making new and profitable
discoveries in fields with which they cannot be familiar; and, so far
as it is available, they had best appraise the originality involved by
the circumstances which preceded, attended and succeeded the
appearance of the invention. Among these will figure the length of
time the art, though needing the invention, went without it: the
number of those who sought to meet the need, and the period over
which their efforts were spread: how many, if any, came upon it at
about the same time, whether before or after: and-perhaps most
important of all-the extent to which it superseded what had gone
before. We have repeatedly declared that in our judgment this ap-
proach is more reliable then a priori conclusions drawn from va-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York; I do know, however, of at least one
that focused on long-felt need evidence. See Todd Protectograph Co. v. Safe-Guard
Check Writer Co., 291 F. 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
" Minton Mfg. Co., v. Cont'l Briar Pipe Co., 93 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1937);
Elec. Mach. Mfg. Co., v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 F.2d 11, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1937); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Paramet Chem. Corp., 82 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1936); Am. Graphophone Co.
v. Universal Talking Mach. Mfg. Co., 151 F. 595, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1907); George Frost
Co. v. Cohn, 119 F. 505, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1902); Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v.
Thum, 111 F. 904, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1901); Schenck v. Singer Mfg. Co., 77 F. 841, 844
(2d Cir. 1897).
7 Textile Mach., 87 F.2d at 704.
Ruben Condenser, 77 F.2d at 268. Professors Merges and Duffy explain the point
this way:
In many situations, valuable innovations are obvious responses to recent changes
in economic, social or technological circumstances. Where those changes are
exogenous to the party seeking patent rights (i.e., that party is not responsible
for the relevant changes), it is neither fair nor economically sensible to confer
on that party exclusive rights to an obvious way to exploit the changed circum-
stance.
ROBERT P. MERGES &JOHN F. DuFFY, PATENT LAw AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 615
(4th ed. 2007).
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porous, and almost inevitably self-dependent, general proposi-
tions. 9
The virtue of the natural experiment that long-felt need evidence estab-
lishes-many tried, only one succeeded-is that it can spare the judiciary
a substantive technological assessment that its generalist judges are not
especially well-suited to make.
III. SECTION 103, AND THE LONG-FELT NEED LAW THAT ALMOST
WAS
By the 1940s, the use of long-felt need evidence to prove nonobvi-
ousness was well-established, as patent law treatises from that era show.40
Safety Car Heating, 155 F.2d at 939. His account in the Landis case is similar:
The issue is always how far beyond commonplace contriving was the foresight
necessary to think out the combination. Usually, though not always, it is practi-
cally impossible to decide that issue by a mere inspection of the patented disclo-
sure against the background of the prior art. Moreover, it scarcely needs more
than the statement of the question to disclose the fatuity of asking judges, undis-
ciplined in the craft and untutored in its inarticulate presuppositions, to say how
far the innovation is beyond the powers of merely competent craftsmen. For that
reason we have over and over again resorted to the history of what went before,
the duration of the period during which the invention was needed but failed to
appear and its acceptance when it did. These circumstances have seemed to us,
not indeed an absolute determinant of invention, for there is none; but at least
the best, and indeed almost always the only, rational approach to a solution.
Landis Mach. Co., 190 F.2d at 546.
40 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 119, at
172 n.1 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1890) (collecting cases for the proposition "[t]hat in-
ventive skill is indicated when the new art or article satisfies a long-felt want and is ac-
cepted as such satisfaction by the public"); id. § 122, at 174-76 ("[T]here is another
fact which indicates ... the necessity for inventive skill in the creation of the means
whereby it is attained. This fact consists in the unsuccessful attempts of others to pro-
duce the same results. The courts assume that no such efforts would be made unless
the want existed and were felt, while from the failure of all previous endeavors to
supply it they draw the inference that nothing then existed in the arts from which the
imitative faculties alone could have constructed a method of attaining to the satisfac-
tion now enjoyed.") (footnote omitted); HARRY A. TOULMIN, JR., INVENTION AND THE
LAW § 37, at 161 (1936) ("Where there has existed in an industry for a considerable
period an unsatisfied public demand for a given result or the accomplishment of a
given object, the one who is able by his invention to satisfy that public demand is an
inventor. The most practical test of utility and novelty depends upon the unsatisfied
public demand, and the extent and character of the use of the invention as the result
of fulfilling that demand."); id. § 38, at 164 ("When, after numerous unsuccessful at-
tempts to produce a given machine or a particular process in order to effect a speci-
fied result, the solution is found which makes a great commercial success in the art,
that is, usually, invention."); id. § 39, at 166-67 ("The contrast between the long
search for results, with the endless accumulation of failures, and the final step that
has turned these failures into success, is a demonstration that there must be invention
in the manner, method, and mechanism proposed by the inventor. In invention, as in
other things, nothing succeeds so much as success."); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK
OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 26 (4th ed. 1904).
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Courts used other methods too, however, 4' and this variety of approaches
42led some to criticize the resulting confusion. As judge Hand colorfully
put it, the nonobviousness "issue is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and
vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal con-
c e p ts .
'43
Congress enacted section 103, according to its Revision Note, "with
the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabiliz-
ing effect" on the case law.4 Others have canvassed the congressional ef-
forts that culminated in the passage of section 103,4' and there is no need
to rehearse those efforts here. Instead, I highlight two aspects of section
103's history. First, I focus on a precursor of section 103 that proposed
using long-felt need as the central standard for nonobviousness. This bill
died in committee, but reflects the prominence of long-felt need evi-
dence as a nonobviousness determinant in the pre-section-103 era. Sec-
ond, I highlight that section 103, by design, provides no substantive con-
tent to the nonobviousness inquiry. Its two central champions, Giles Rich
and P.J. Federico, 46 acknowledged as much about the section 103 frame-
41 This is not the place to offer a comprehensive review of the range of nonobvi-
ousness frameworks the courts used. For discussions of the courts' approaches, see
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 38, at 626-30; John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case
Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1 (2007); Edward B. Gregg, Tracing the Con-
cept of "Patentable Invention," 13 VILL. L. REv. 98 (1968); Lawrence C. Kingsland, The
Statutes and Decisions Presenting the Better Tests of Inventions, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 473
(1952); Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966
SuP. CT. REv. 293 (1966); Frank D. Prager, Standards of Patentable Invention from 1474 to
1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1952); Robbins, supra note 27; Sears, supra note 8.
12 See, e.g., NAT'L PATENT PLANNING COMM'N, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM, H.R.
Doc. No. 78-239, at 5 (1943) ("The most serious weakness in the present patent sys-
tem is the lack of a uniform test or standard for determining whether the particular
contribution of an inventor merits the award of the patent grant.... The present
confusion threatens the usefulness of the whole patent system and calls for an imme-
diate and effective remedy."); Comment, Patent Policy and Invention, 46 ILL. L. REv.
609, 612 (1951) ("Standing for basic policy considerations, this indefinable require-
ment has been the subject of much confused and inconsistent language of the judici-
ary."). Professor Mueller, summarizing the pessimism of that time, recounts that
"[j]udges in different courts around the United States came to treat 'invention'
somewhat like obscenity, by applying an I-know-it-when-I-see-it type of analysis devoid
of common guidelines or uniform analytical framework." MUELLER, supra note 17, at
171.
Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
" S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2411 [here-
inafter Revision Notes].
'5 See, e.g., STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION (Comm. Print 1958). This study re-
port is one of a series collected in the two-volume work entitled Research Studies in Pat-
ent Law, 1956-1963. RESEARCH STUDIES IN PATENT LAW VOLUME I & II, 1956-1963
(Hein & Co., 1979).
16 Rich and Federico described their respective roles in bringing about § 103 in a
group of essays. See P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 87 (1977); P.J.
Federico, Further Comments and Observations on the Origin of Section 103, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 30, at 1:301; Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent-Or, Who
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work. It is no surprise, then, that this framework-bare as it is-can com-
fortably accommodate long-felt need evidence in the prescribed level of
skill inquiry.
A. The Gamble (Really, the Meigs) Bill
In May 1948, the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Patents held hearings over three days to consider bills that would amend
the patent laws 7.4 Two of the bills addressed what we now know as the
nonobviousness requirement of section 103. One of the bills, H.R. 5248,
would have added the following language to the Patent Act:
Patentability of inventions and discoveries, including discoveries
due to research, and improvements thereof, shall be determined
objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of
the art, and not subjectively by the nature of the mental process by
which the invention or discovery, or the improvement thereof, may
481have been accomplished.
This language, akin to a fix the National Patent Planning Commission
49had proposed in its 1943 report, is plainly similar to the language we
now see in section 103(a)'s second sentence: "Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."50 It would
have ruled out a disfavored approach to assessing nonobviousness, rather
than provide a metric of nonobviousness.
The other bill, H.R. 4061, did seek to provide an affirmative metric.
In addition to stating that the nonobviousness "question shall be one of
fact," this bill made long-felt need the central metric:
If the preponderating weight of such evidence shows that the subject matter of
the claim complies with the requirements previously set forth in this
section and fills a long-felt want, such evidence shall be deemed sufficient
to constitute proof that the subject matter of the claim amounts to invention,
provided the preponderating weight of such evidence further shows
that, prior to such invention, the skill of the art to which the inven-
Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 30, at 1:1; Giles S. Rich,
Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 30, at 1:201. Pro-
fessor Mueller describes the two as "co-authors" of the 1952 Patent Act. MUELLER, su-
pra note 17, at 171.
17 See Contributory Infringement in Patents-Definition of Invention: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-marks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R, 80th
Cong. (1948) (Serial No. 21) [hereinafter Hearings].
"' STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, supra note 45, at 3 (providing text of H.R.
5248, 80th Cong.); Hearings, supra note 47, at 2 (same).
4" See NAT'L PATENT PLANNING COMM'N, supra note 42, at 6 ("The Commission
therefore recommends the enactment of a declaration of policy that patentability
shall be determined objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement
of the art, and not subjectively by the nature of the process by which the invention
may have been accomplished.").
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).Judge Rich noted the connection in his account of
section 103's genesis. See Rich, Why and How, supra note 46, at 1:209-10.
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tion appertains had not supplied such want and in its then state of
development was unable so to do.5'
Although Representative Gamble of New York introduced this bill,
52
it was authored by Joseph V. Meigs, a patent lawyer who practiced in New
York City.53 As Meigs explained at the hearing on the bill, his intent was
for the bill to "reestablish" "what Judge Hand has referred to as the clas-
sic test of an invention. ,54 The text of the bill suggests that evidence of
long-felt need would not be the exclusive way to show nonobviousness,
and Meigs's formal written statement in support of the bill denies any in-
tent to create an exclusive test.
55
56Giles Rich also appeared at the hearing on the Meigs bill. Rich ac-
knowledged that "[t]he courts have been applying" the long-felt need
approach "for years." 57 He spoke against H.R. 4061, however, on the
ground that its focus on a single positive metric of nonobviousness was
too restrictive:
I am speaking for the New York Patent Law Association. The
principal objection [to H.R. 4061] is that it legislates into existence
simply one of the tests which is applied to the term "invention."
5' STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THEJJUDICIARY, supra note 45, at 7 (providing text of H.R.
4061, 80th Cong.) (emphasis added); Hearings, supra note 47, at 2 (same) (emphasis
added).
12 Hearings, supra note 47, at 35. Representative Gamble served in Congress
from November 1937 to January 1957. Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress, Gamble, Ralph Abernathy, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=G000031.
51 See Hearings, supra note 47, at 35, 43-44; Joseph V. Meigs, 65, Ex-Patent Lawyer,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1959, at 86 (obituary). I find Joseph Meigs a highly engaging fig-
ure in the story of section 103. As he explained at the congressional hearing at which
he testified, he "d[id] not represent any association or group." Hearings, supra note
47, at 36. So far as it appears from the hearing, he simply saw a legal problem in need
of a solution-the case law's confusion about nonobviousness-and offered the best
solution he could devise. Law was Meigs's second career. His first was as a chemist,
during which he co-authored a book, see CARLETON ELLIS &JOSEPH V. MEIGS, GASOLINE
AND OTHER MOTOR FUEtS (1921), and received a number of patents, see, e.g., U.S. Pat-
ent No. 1,868,215 (filed Mar. 5, 1926); U.S. Patent No. 1,868,216 (filed Jan. 15, 1927).
As a patent lawyer, he wrote at least two books and two articles. SeeJOSEPH V. MEIGS,
TIME, THE ESSENCE OF PATENT LAW (1940); JOSEPH V. MEIGS, INTERPRETATION OF
PATENT CLAIMS (1937);Joseph V. Meigs, Court Proceedings Based on Patent Office Opposi-
tions and Cancellations, 26J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 664 (1944); Joseph V. Meigs, Panics, Pros-
perity and Patents, 66 U.S. L. REv. 243 (1932).
"' Hearings, supra note 47, at 38; see also id. at 42 ("[T]he whole theory.., is if an
invention... is a matter of mere skill of an artisan or technologist, then the existence
of a demand would normally produce that invention and the fact that it has not been
produced shows that something beyond skill is required because the pressure of the
demand would, if it merely required the skill of an artisan or technologist, ordinary
skill, would produce that article.").
5 Id. at 39 ("No all-embracing comprehensive definition of what constitutes in-
vention has ever been devised and H.R. 4061 does not attempt to do so.").
56 Id. at 46-49.
5' Id. at 46.
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We think that would be a very bad policy, that it would emphasize
this one test as against all of the others, and that it might have a bad
influence on the courts and incline them away from sustaining the
validity of the patent which happened to fall into situations where
there isn't any long-felt want.
The Chicago Patent Law Association voiced much the same objec-
tion. Given that confusion was the principal vice of the then-existing
cases, it would seem the professional patent associations rejected the
good in the hopes of achieving what they viewed to be the perfect. In-
deed, as Judge Rich later remarked, they "feared that to enact as statutory
law only one of the pro-invention tests would be worse than nothing."6 °
The Meigs bill "was not reported out of committee. 6 ' Four years af-
62ter the hearing, Congress enacted section 103.
B. "Section 103-It's metric free!"
Most statutes don't have slogans. The nonobviousness requirement is
no exception. If, however, it had a slogan, the one my subheading offers
could serve well enough.
Section 103 does not actually provide a metric for measuring
whether the technical advance embodied in the invention under review is
a large enough advance in the art to merit patent rights. This may seem
surprising, given that '"nonobviousness can accurately be described as a
'nontriviality' requirement in patent law." 63 Nevertheless, all section 103
provides is a framework that helps guide one's nonobviousness judg-
ment. Specifically, the statute gives a set of interrelated "basic factual in-
quiries. 6 4 "Against th [e] background" the resulting findings provide, the
Supreme Court instructs, "the obviousness or nonobviousness of the sub-
ject matter is determined.",65 The metric is not provided. Professors
Merges and Duffy state the quandary this way: "But how precisely does a
court make that ultimate determination? Graham is not clear on that
point ... "66
5' Id. at 47.
59 Id. at 88 ("We believe that the determination of the question of invention must
be left to the sound discretion of the court according to the particular case, giving
due weight to the various tests of invention which have been set forth in various court
decisions. [ ] To try to substitute some 'nickel and slot' method of determining in-
vention ... will not, it is believed, aid in a solution of this inherently difficult ques-
tion.").
60 Rich, Why and How, supra note 46, at 1:208-09.
"1 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, supra note 45, at 3.
62 PUB L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952).
63 MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 38, at 612.
" Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
65Id.
MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 38, at 663.
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Perhaps the lack of a metric in section 103 is less surprising when we
consider the objections to the Meigs bill, described above. The profes-
sional patent law associations did not want a positive metric; rather, they
wanted to eliminate the "flash of creative genius" standard invoked in the
much-reviled Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.67-a goal
achieved in section 103(a)'s second sentence68-and to "have some stabi-
69lizing effect" on the cases. Interestingly, section 103's Revision Note
obliquely observes that the provision has no positive metric of nonobvi-
ousness, calling it "a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria
which may be worked out.
7 °
Separately, Rich and Federico noted that section 103 gives a frame-
work for making a judgment, not a standard for that judgment. Describ-
ing section 103, Judge Rich opined that "there was no need for a positive
statement saying how patentability shall be determined, a statement also
felt to be dangerous as possibly restrictive" (echoing his objection to the
Meigs bill)." Federico, in a similar vein, said, "I look at Section 103 as a
requirement or a condition for patentability, rather than a standard ....
There is no standard in this section. It sets up a requirement (in a nega-
tive manner); how one is going to determine whether the requirement
has been met is not answered by the section. 7 2 Finally, some commenta-
tors criticized section 103 precisely because it fails to give a positive met-
ric of nonobviousness. Judge Galston, for example, complained of the
continued need for "guessing" and then echoed the Meigs bill: "All of
this could have been avoided by the simple requirement that a long exist-
ing and unsatisfied need in the art at the time the invention was made,
with data available, would raise a presumption of invention. 73
We are left, then, with the basic factual inquiries that section 103
prescribes. One of these, "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
67 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). According to Judge Rich, Cuno "drove patent lawyers
up the wall." Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J.
26, 30 (1972).
'8 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15. In Graham, the Court sheepishly disavowed Cuno's
flash language as "but a rhetorical embellishment." Id. at 15 n.7.
9 Revision Notes, supra note 44, at 2411.
7o Id. (emphasis added).
7' Rich, Why and How, supra note 46, at 1:211.
72 pj. Federico, Further Comments and Observations on the Origins of Section 103, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 30, at 1:304; see also P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act (1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 184 (1993)
("The problem of what is obvious and hence not patentable is still of necessity one of
judgment. The statute does not purport to categorize the particular criteria accord-
ing to which the judgment is to be exercised .... ").
73 Galston, supra note 14, at 465. See also Prager, supra note 41, at 95 ("Conflicts
between past decisions will not be eliminated by a new magical formula like the test
whether 'the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious.' In spite of the op-
position of a minority of judges it would be more constructive to set forth detailed
and historically accepted rules of invention.").
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art,, 74 seems to be a natural occasion for canvassing the art's recognition
of the problem the claimed invention solves, and the art's relative suc-
cess-or failure-at solving that problem. In short, long-felt need evi-
dence fits comfortably within the section 103 framework. Courts, for their
part, continued to use it.
IV. THE FORGOTTEN FUTURE OF THE LEVEL OF SKILL INQUIRY
Courts continued, after the passage of section 103, to rely on long-
felt need evidence in assessing nonobviousness. Judge Hand, for exam-
ple, wrote for the Second Circuit that "we can see no escape from meas-
uring invention in cases where all the elements of the new combination
had been long available, (1) by whether the need had long existed and
been desired, and (2) whether, when it was eventually contrived, it was
widely exploited as a substitute for what had gone before."'7 5 Moreover, he
continued to ground his strong preference for evidence of long-felt need
on the institutional competence analysis he offered in Safety Car Heating.
Calling the "test laid down" in section 103 "misty enough," he justified his
approach as follows:
It directs us to surmise what was the range of ingenuity of a person
'having ordinary skill' in an 'art' with which we are totally unfamil-
iar; and we do not see how such a standard can be applied at all ex-
cept by recourse to the earlier work in the art, and to the general
history of the means available at the time. To judge on our own that
this or that new assemblage of old factors was, or was not, 'obvious'
is to substitute our ignorance for the acquaintance with the subject
of those who were familiar with it. There are indeed some sign
posts: e.g. how long did the need exist; how many tried to find the
way; how long did the surrounding and accessory arts disclose the
means; how immediately was the invention recognized as an answer
by those who used the new variant?
76
The Tenth Circuit, at least, also continued in the years before Graham to
rely on long-felt need evidence as a key indicator of nonobviousness.77
7' Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
7' Norman v. Lawrence, 285 F.2d 505, 506 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Lyon v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955) ("The most competent workers
in the field had for at least ten years been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to pre-
vent reflection; there had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile
nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into opera-
tion; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied substantially
the whole field. We do not see how any combination of evidence could more com-
pletely demonstrate that, simple as it was, the change had not been 'obvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the art'-§ 103.").
76 Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960).
7' McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 399 (10th Cir. 1965);
Bewal, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 292 F.2d 159, 164-65 (10th Cir. 1961).
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The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits focused on long-felt need evi-
dence even after Graham.78
Judge Hand died in 1961, four years before the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Graham. He thus did not have an opportunity to explain how
best to knit together his prior focus on long-felt need evidence with the
Supreme Court's apparent preference for thinking of long-felt need and
the failure of others as a "secondary consideration []" that can "give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought
to be patented."79 Specifically, would he have viewed the level of skill in-
quiry as an appropriate rubric for considering whether the record shows
evidence of a long-felt, unmet need and failures of others to meet that
need? Some of his decisions suggest that he would."s In any event, we
know with certainty that others did take this view. Two decisions, in par-
ticular, merit discussion here.
In Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., the Ninth Cir-
cuit reviewed a trial court decision upholding the nonobviousness of pat-
ent claims directed to an apparatus for "checking the operation of the
numerous elements of an analog computer prior to utilization of the
computer. ",8 As the court recounted in detail, "the problem of checking
analog computers was born with the development of such computers and
ha[d] since occupied much time and effort in the computer industry.
8 2
78 Shackelton v. J. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 689 F.2d 334, 340-41 (2d Cir.
1982); U.S. Philips Corp. v. Nat'l Micronetics Inc., 550 F.2d 716, 723 (2d Cir. 1977);
Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 294 (2d Cir. 1975); A.E. Staley Mfg. v.
Harvest Brand, Inc., 452 F.2d 735, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1971); Reeves Instrument Corp.
v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 272 (9th Cir. 1971).
9 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. The Supreme Court did not explain what it meant
by the phrase "secondary considerations." Id. Moreover, the student note the Court
cited (after listing examples) did not, itself, use this phrase. See Robbins, supra note
27. Instead, the Robbins note refers to "subtests" of nonobviousness that "would be
based upon nontechnical facts." Id. at 1172.
'0 See, e.g., Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1947)
("In dealing with the issue of invention, we have tried, so far as possible, to rely upon
objective factors in preference to our a priori judgment, drawn from what seems to
our untutored experience to be within the range of a person skilled in the art. In-
stead of trying ourselves to mirror his capacities, we look to the length of time during
which the incentive existed to contrive the invention, to the number of unsuccessful
efforts that were made in that period, to the density-so to speak-of those efforts at
about the time when the invention was made, to whether success came independently
to several inventors at about the same time, and to the extent to which after the in-
vention appeared, it supplanted what had gone before. These usually are hard ques-
tions to answer; but when they can be answered, they form a substantial basis for in-
ference.") (footnote omitted); Kirsch Mfg. Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co., 6 F.2d 793,
794 (2d Cir. 1925) ("Courts cannot avoid the duty of divining as best they can what the
day to day capacity of the ordinary artisan will produce. This they attempt by looking at the
history of the art, the occasion for the invention, its success, its independent repetition
at about the same time, and the state of the underlying art, which was a condition
upon its appearance at all.") (emphasis added).
S444 F.2d 263, 263 (9th Cir. 1971).
12 Id. at 264.
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McCoy, the named inventor of the patent in question, solved the prob-. 83 ..
lem, where many others had failed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's judgment. In the course of doing so, the court quoted from Gra-
ham as "the most definitive statement of the requirement of nonobvious-
ness" under section 103.4 After noting the content of the prior art, and
the key difference between the claims and that prior art, the court
brought the traditional long-felt need approach under the umbrella of
the level of skill inquiry:
Whether this difference rises to the level of patentability depends
upon the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. It is difficult to
set forth any meaningful quantitative evaluation of the level of skill
in a given art. Rather, such determination can be made only by an
analysis of the problem allegedly solved by the invention and the ef-
forts of others to arrive at a satisfactory solution. In this respect, the
Supreme Court has noted that "[sluch secondary consideration as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surround-
ing the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." 5
The court thus felt quite comfortable using long-felt need evidence to as-
sess the skill that ordinary artisans had brought to bear, unsuccessfully,
86on the problem the claimed invention solved. The failure of others to
meet the longstanding need, which was surely a reflection of their level of
skill, was a circumstance surrounding the origin of the claimed subject
matter and, thus, fair game for consideration.
Four years after Reeves, the Court of Claims-one of the Federal Cir-
cuit's two predecessor courts, the decisions of which the Federal Circuit
adopted as binding precedent at its creationS7-followed the Reeves
court's approach to the level of skill inquiry. In Jacobson Bros. v. United
States, a Court of Claims appellate panel affirmed a trial court decision
rejecting a patent infringement claim against the United States on the
88ground that the patent in suit was invalid for obviousness. Indeed, the
panel adopted the trial judge's decision as its own. Relying on Reeves as
'3 Id. at 272-73.
84 Id. at 271.
Id. at 271-72 (quoting Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)).
Id. at 272 ("Substantial efforts by others in the art which fail to accomplish the
result achieved by the patented invention are persuasive indications of nonobvious-
ness.").
87 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("That body
of law represented by the holdings of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals announced before the close of business on September 30, 1982 is
most applicable to the areas of law within the substantive jurisdiction of this new
court. It is also most familiar to members of the bar. Accordingly, that body of law is
herewith adopted by this court sitting in banc.").
" 512 F.2d 1065, 1066 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
89 Id.
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well as Judge Hand's decisions in Reiner and Safety Car Heating, the Court
of Claims analyzed the level of skill inquiry this way:
The determination of whether these differences are sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of nonobviousness contemplated by § 103
must be made with reference to "a person having ordinary skill in
the art." A finite quantitative definition of this ordinarily skilled
person is difficult at best. Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951;
Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960). Rather the various
prior art approaches employed, the types of problems encountered
in the art, the rapidity with which innovations are made, the sophis-
tication of the technology involved, and the educational back-
ground of those actively working in the field are among the factors
which will ofttimes aid in developing a picture of what is the level of
skill of the ordinary person in an art. Considerations such as com-
mercial success and the failure of others, characterized as "secon-
dary" in Graham, are nonetheless invaluable as real-life indicia not
only of the level of skill in the art but also in the ultimate determi-
nation of validity. See, e. g., Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gen-
eralElectric Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946). 90
Jacobson, even more clearly than Reeves, roots the level of skill inquiry in
Judge Hand's long-felt-need jurisprudence, harmonizing the latter with
section 103.
The Federal Circuit, far from overturning Jacobson, has relied on Ja-
cobson as the cornerstone of its level of skill jurisprudence. 9' Curiously,
however, the Federal Circuit's cases make no mention of Jacobson's ex-
press reliance on long-felt need evidence (or the lack of it) to help estab-
lish the level of skill in a given art at a given time. Instead, the Federal
Circuit lists evidentiary factors that do not include, at least on the surface,
evidence of long-felt need in the art or the failure of others to meet that
need.92 Is there room in the modern level of skill inquiry for long-felt
Id. at 1070-71.
The leading Federal Circuit case on analyzing the level of skill in the art re-
mains Environmental Designs, .Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See,
e.g., Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
Environmental Designs); Meara, supra note 4, at 277-78 (noting the status of Environ-
mental Designs). Environmental Designs cites the Federal Circuit's analysis of level of skill
in Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
1983). See Environmental, 713 F.2d at 696 (citing All Orthopedic). All Orthopedic, in turn,
quotes the level of skill analysis in Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005,
1011 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See All Orthopedic, 707 F.2d at 1382. Finally, Orthopedic Equip.
quotes Jacobson's list of factors pertaining to the level of skill inquiry, but omits the
references to Reeves, Reiner, and Safety Car Heating. See Orthopedic Equip., 702 F.2d at
1011.
92 See Environmental Designs, 713 F.2d at 696 ("Factors that may be considered in
determining level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) the educational level of the
inventor; (2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication of the
technology; and (6) educational level of active workers in the field.").
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need evidence? The door to such evidence is still ajar: "These factors
[from Environmental Designs] are not exhaustive but are merely a guide to
determining the level of ordinary skill in the art., 93 Moreover, the third
Environmental Designs factor-"prior art solutions to those (prior art]
problems" 94-retains a slight trace of Judge Hand's focus on the history
of the art, with its successes and failures.
Reeves and Jacobson wove Hand's nonobviousness jurisprudence into
the level of skill inquiry. The Federal Circuit has dropped this thread, but
not severed it. A skilled advocate can, I think, pick it up again.
V. CONCLUSION
"A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
,,95
an automaton. To determine what would have been obvious to such a
person of ordinary skill, we must, the Supreme Court instructs, use "an
expansive and flexible approach."9 An unbroken line of cases from
187697 to 198298 show the prudence of looking to evidence of long-felt
need, and the failure of others to meet that need, when assessing
whether an invention would have been obvious to the PHOSITA. These
cases also show the ease with which the level of skill inquiry embraces
such evidence. Perhaps, as advocates flex their own creativity in the wake
of KSR, they will reinvigorate the synthesis glimpsed in Reeves and Jacob-
son.
9 Daiichi, 501 F.3d at 1256.
713 F.2d at 696.
'5 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).
96 Id. at 1739.
97 Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486, 494-95 (1876).
" Shackelton v. J. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 689 F.2d 334, 340-41 (2d Cir.
1982).
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